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INTRODUCTION
The Word Trade Organization (“WTO”) Marrakesh agree-
ments1 are treaties negotiated between Member States to help trade
flow as freely as possible by lowering interstate trade barriers.2 Conse-
quently, the organization regulates in areas that are inevitably a prod-
uct of globalization that generates new problems and disputes
requiring international cooperation.3 The WTO accommodates for the
resolution of such disputes by the creation of the Dispute Settlement
1 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S 3 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
2 Understanding the WTO: Who We Are, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.
wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
3 AMRITA NARLIKAR, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION A VERY SHOT INTRODUC-
TION 59 (2005).
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Understanding (“DSU”)4. The utilization of the DSU, however, is lim-
ited to disputes between Member States and does not provide a venue
for private litigants to address their concerns.5 Indeed, private liti-
gants will not be able to utilize the DSU mechanism anytime soon.6
Though the WTO obligations are, at least theoretically, supposed to
help producers of goods and services conduct their business, the obliga-
tions only bind Member States and do not confer rights on private
individuals.7
Yet, as the WTO evolves, so does the legalism of the organiza-
tion.8 This comment proposes a mechanism of private enforcement of
the WTO obligations against Member States. The mechanism is de-
rived from the laws of the European Union (“EU”). The theory, how-
ever, is only applied to the Trade Related Agreement on Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPS”)9 agreement section of the Marrakesh
Agreement.10 TRIPS is part of the Marrakesh Agreement package and
it requires Member States to provide a minimum standard of protec-
tion for intellectual property rights.11 It also requires WTO Members
to incorporate the agreement’s obligations into their national laws.12
For this reason, the requirement of national implementation of inter-
national obligation may render the TRIPS agreement more fixable to
private enforcement.13 With such an arrangement, the private liti-
gant, for instance, could challenge the constitutionality of national law
4 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.C 401 [hereinafter DSU].
5 Dispute Settlement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (“The authors of these
agreements are the member governments themselves — the agreements are the
outcome of negotiations among members. Ultimate responsibility for settling dis-
putes also lies with member governments, through the Dispute Settlement
Body.”).
6 The WTO in Brief, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2014) (stating that
WTO negotiation “bind governments to keep their trade policies within agreed
limits to everybody’s benefit.”).
7 Id. (stating that WTO negotiations’ purpose is to help producers but they are
negotiated by governments and only bind governments).
8 NARLIKAR, supra note 3, at 86.
9 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, 1869 U.N.T.C 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
10 See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 1.
11 TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 3, 4.
12 Id. art. 1.
13 See infra Part III.B.
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implementing the TRIPS as opposed to the terms of the international
agreement itself.14
This nature also facilitates the analysis in light of EU law. The
requirement to implement TRIPS obligation under the national legal
order makes the agreement very similar to EU directives,15 which are
binding in their result yet give Member States of the EU the freedom
in their implementation.16
The EU principles that are relevant to the proposal in this com-
ment are the Principle of Direct Effect17 and the Principle of State Lia-
bility.18 Under EU law, and in the event that an EU Member State
fails to honor its obligation under the EU treaties, the two principles
enable private litigants to enforce their rights which EU law has con-
ferred on them.19
The theoretical exercise in this article applies EU Principles of
Direct Effect and State Liability to the recent Novartis AG v. Union of
India20 (“Novartis v. UOI”) case. In Novartis v. UOI, the claimant al-
leged that India, a WTO member, failed to honor its TRIPS obliga-
tions. In 2005, India amended its intellectual property (“IP”) laws to
bring them in conformity with its obligations under TRIPS. However,
Novartis alleged that the current amendments are contrary to India’s
obligations under the TRIPS agreement. Although the outcome would
probably not be any different, Novartis provides a useful factual pat-
tern to apply the proposed mechanism.
It is worthwhile to keep in mind that the EU legal order may
sound different, yet theoretically, it is the same as the WTO agree-
ments: an international agreement, signed by members of different
sovereign, in the wake of the Second World War, for the purpose of
trade liberalization, and ultimately benefiting the nations and citizens
of the members to agreement.21 What was then farfetched, like relin-
14 See e.g. Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2007) 4 MADRAS L.J. 1153 [hereinafter
Novartis v. UOI (Mardas H.C.)], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/456550/
High-Court-order-Novartis-Union-of-India, aff’d, Novartis AG v. Union of India,
Civil Appeal Nos. 2706-2716 of 2013 (India Apr. 1, 2013) [hereinafter Novarits v.
UOI (Ind.)], available at http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=
40212.
15 See infra Part III.C.2.b.iii.
16 The European Parliament, SOURCES AND SCOPE OF EUROPEAN UNION
LAW 3 (2014), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.2.1.
pdf.
17 See infra Part III.
18 See infra Part III.
19 See Infra Part II.C.
20  Norvartis v. UOI (Ind.), supra note 14, at X.
21 Compare PASCAL FONTAINE, EUROPE IN 12 LESSONS at 6 (2010), available at
http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/europe-in-12-lessons-pbNA3110652 (“To ensure that
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quishing state autonomy and control on issues of trade to a higher
body, is now the current reality.
This comment is divided into three sections. Part I introduces
the WTO generally and analyzes the TRIPS agreement specifically.
Part II discusses the proposed theory and its basis. It then introduces
Novartis. The comment then explores the relevant EU laws and ana-
lyzes the jurisprudence of Direct Effect and State Liability. Part III
applies EU law to Novartis.
PART I: THE WTO AND TRIPS: A BIT OF BACKGROUND
A. WTO-Generally
The Marrakesh Agreement22 is composed of four Annexes. It
covers mainly three areas of international trade: goods, services, and
intellectual property.23 The purpose of the WTO is to provide a forum
that facilitates multilateral trade liberalization.24 The expected bene-
fits of membership are market access, protection against the powerful
developed countries, and enforceable dispute-settlement mechanism.25
Those benefits, however, are certainly debatable. Yet regardless of the
debate on the politicized “questionable decision-making process,” and
the willingness to give up a lot, Member States still believe that the
benefits of belonging to the WTO outweigh the downsides.26 This is
apparent from the membership increase since the creation of the
WTO.27 The organization started with 123 members in 1995 and the
membership increased to 159 members by March 2013.28
as many people as possible benefit from this Europe-wide market of 500 million
consumers, the EU is endeavouring to remove obstacles to trade and is working to
free businesses from unnecessary red tape.”), with The WTO in Brief, supra note 6
(stating that WTO negotiations’ purpose is to help producers but they are negoti-
ated by governments and only bind governments).
22 Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 1.
23 NARLIKAR, supra note 3, at 60.
24 Id. at 51.
25 Id. at 58.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 51.
28 Compare The Uruguay Round, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2014), with
Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/en-
glish/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
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B. The TRIPS Agreement
1. Generally
Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement contains the TRIPS
agreement.29 TRIPS establishes minimum standards that countries
must abide by in seven areas30 of intellectual property rights. The
agreement is based on the principles of transparency and non-discrim-
ination between Member States.31
2. Reasons for Inclusion
There are several reasons32 for the inclusion of TRIPS under
the WTO package.33 First, developed countries were pushing for the
expansion of the WTO mandates in the directions of new issues.34 In
fact, the agreement was a product of U.S. and EU concerns that their
competitive advantage as exporters of intellectual property was being
undermined by counterfeits.35 Second, by the 1980s and concurrent
with the WTO negotiations, the United States started imposing unilat-
eral sanctions on developing countries that are in breach of the U.S.
patent laws.36 Fearing such threats; developing countries began to re-
consider their opposition to TRIPS. Third, developing countries under-
estimated the technical nature of TRIPS and, at the time of signing
the agreement, believed that TRIPS was limited to counterfeit goods
when the agreement was far more complex that what the developing
countries perceived.37
3. Two Sides of the Debate
TRIPS is an exceptional agreement and perhaps the most im-
portant development in international intellectual property law since
29 TRIPS, supra note 9.
30 The areas of intellectual property that TRIPs covers are: copyright and related
rights, trademarks,  geographical indications,  industrial designs, patents; the lay-
out-designs of integrated circuits, and undisclosed information including trade
secrets and test data. Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZA-
TION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Jan.
17, 2014).
31 TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 3, 4.
32 Those reasons are not exclusive.
33 NARLIKAR, supra note 3, at 82.
34 Id. at 82.
35 Id. at 81.
36 Special 301 section of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 em-
powered the U.S. Trade Representative to threaten countries with objectionable
IPR regime. Id. at 82.
37 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\13-2\RGL205.txt unknown Seq: 7 29-MAY-14 9:38
2014] PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF TRIPS 415
the 1880s.38 However, the agreement has been criticized severely on
several grounds. First, the treaty may be far reaching and affects vital
sectors in a country, including health services, human rights, and eco-
nomic and technological development.39 Second, it raises clear issues
of economic coercion and reveals the adverse effects of intellectual
property on economic development, access to food, medicines, public
goods, and ultimately sustainable development.40 Third, it also has
been labeled as a treaty of adhesion that is unfair to developing
countries.41
On the other side, the WTO defends the agreement on the basis
that it strikes a balance between the long term benefits and possible
short term costs to society.42 Society benefits in the long term when
intellectual property protection encourages creation and invention, es-
pecially when the period of protection expires and the creations and
inventions enter the public domain.43 For better or for worse, TRIPS
was included as part of WTO package.44
C. The Dispute Settlement Understanding
1. Generally
Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement concerns the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (“DSU”).45 The DSU and the WTO enforce-
ment mechanism are unique in the history of interstate dispute resolu-
tions.46 The “jewel in the crown” of the WTO achievement is the
powerful DSU and through this DSU, it has been said, the WTO has
acquired teeth.47 For better or worse, the mechanism embodies an un-
precedented level of legalization in the WTO.48 The developments are
significant with major system-wide consequences.49
38 Donald P. Harris, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far: Trips and Treaties of Adhe-
sion, 27 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 681, 724 (2006).
39 Id. at 749.
40 Id. at 683-84.
41 Id. at 685.
42 Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZA-
TION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 11, 2014).
43 Id.
44 NARLIKAR, supra note 3, at 82.
45 DSU, supra note 4.
46 Harris, supra note 38, at 749.
47 NARLIKAR, supra note 3, at 85.
48 Id. at 85.
49 Id.
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2. Characteristics
There are several significant characteristics to the DSU. First,
the use of the DSU is the exclusive responsibility of the Member
States50 and private parties have no access to the WTO venues. A dis-
pute arises when one country adopts a trade policy measure that other
WTO members consider to be breaking the WTO agreements, or when
a country fails to live up to its obligations.51 The DSU allows for the
creation of the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) that could issue deci-
sions that compel a Member States to abide by the rules of the WTO or
face retaliation by another Member States.52 Second, contrary to its
predecessor in the GAAT, the establishment of the DSB and the adop-
tion of a panel report can no longer be blocked by one of the parties of a
dispute.53 Finally, the parties can also appeal a panel ruling to the
Appellate Body (“AB”) on points of law, creating a two-tiered dispute
settlement system.
3. Two Sides of the Debate
The WTO praises the system as being time efficient54 charac-
terized by structured procedural process.55 The mechanism also de-
prives developed countries from resorting to unilateral and bilateral
measures and imports certainty and predictability in the system.56 By
contrast, some view the dispute settlement system as structurally im-
balanced and claim it favors powerful members.57 Developing coun-
tries find it difficult to use the mechanism in their advantage.58
D. Private Enforcement of TRIPS against Member States
Currently, the WTO treaty does not provide for private enforce-
ment of the WTO obligations nor does it grant individual access to the
DSB.59 This is understandable. Currently the Appellate Body is facing
50 Id. at 89.
51 Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http:/
/www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Jan. 11,
2014).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 According to the WTO, disputes should not take longer than 15 months, includ-
ing the appeal process. See id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Harris, supra note 38, at 687.
58 NARLIKAR, supra note 3, at 86.
59 See id. at 89.
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significant growth in the volume of disputes.60 The system is already
operating at its maximum with only 153 possible litigants. It would be
impossible to contain the workload if private parties had access to the
DSB and the DSB opened its gate “to the world.”61
This comment, however, provides a theoretical procedure that
may enable the private enforcement of one of the WTO agreements
against Member States. The procedure is limited to TRIPS but it may
be a partial solution to such limited access to the “fortress of the DSB.”
Before exploring the procedure, it may be beneficial to examine the
pros and cons of it. The argument for and against private enforcement
of TRIPS against a Member State may shed light on its utility.
1. Argument for Private Enforcement of TRIPS
There are several arguments that may support the need for
private enforcement of TRIPS agreement. First, the need for private
enforcement may stem from defects in the WTO system generally and
the dispute settlement system specifically. The WTO negotiation pro-
cess can sometimes skew the outcomes in favor of the already powerful
in the WTO.62 Additionally, recent remarks by a former WTO judge
convey a sentiment of frustration on the current situation, and warn-
ing on the future of the dispute settlement system.63 The judge criti-
cizes the stagnation in the development WTO negotiations.64 He
stresses on the need for “legislative complement” and development in
the WTO project as a whole, otherwise the “the institution will wither,
and with it, the system of dispute settlement.”65 The judge also advo-
cates the reform of the dispute settlement system to make it more effi-
cient and capable of handing the increase in the number and
complexity of cases. Such views only support the need for an alterna-
tive to the current disputes settlement procedure if the system were to
survive. Second, the WTO Appellate Body stated that treaties are “the
international equivalent of contracts.”66 Hence, it could be argued that
60 WTO Appellate Body Chairman Reiterates Concerns Over Increased Workload,
Delays, Int’l Trade Daily Online (BNA) No. 51 (Mar. 17, 2014) (“The ‘overall trend
since 1995 has been a significant increase in the workload of the Appellate Body,’
Ramirez-Hernandez said. ‘The year 2013 has been an exceptionally busy year for
WTO panels and it is to be expected that this will translate into a heavy workload
for the Appellate Body in 2014 and beyond.’”).
61 Cf. id.
62 NARLIKAR, supra note 3, at 51.
63 Former WTO Judge Says Failure to Advance Trade Agenda Threatens to Frag-
ment System. 31 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.6, at 264-65 (Feb. 6, 2014).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Appellate Body Report, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 15, WT/DS8/AB/
R (Oct. 4, 1996).
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if a country fails to honor its commitment under TRIPS, a private citi-
zen should not be the victim when the failure is attributed to the Mem-
ber State. Third, addressing social, economic, and political concerns
can rescue the international system from structural imbalances in the
WTO dispute settlement system that favors powerful members.67 It is
not surprising then when a former WTO judge says that the Appellate
Body “does not represent the membership, but it must reflect the di-
versity that makes up the membership” and that “it has always been a
strength of the Appellate Body  that its Members come from very dif-
ferent legal traditions, and very different societies.” Thus, private en-
forcement in national courts may be a mechanism to address the
concerns of the judge.68 This is because national courts may be better
equipped in addressing such concerns than the WTO bodies.69 Third,
broadening the WTO jurisdiction may stretch the limited WTO re-
sources and may result in inconsistency in international law.70 Conse-
quently, WTO panels and Appellate Bodies should be reserved as a
last resource. Fourth, TRIPS allows Member States to take public in-
terest into consideration when implementing the TRIPS obligations.71
Hence, a national court may be at a better position in interpreting the
special interest of a Member State and may be an effective means to
retain the cultural diversity of the WTO and limit the global Ameri-
canization of intellectual property rights (“IPR”) enforcement.72 Fifth,
a helpful analogy could be drawn from the EU legal order. Just like an
EU directive, TRIPS is an instructive agreement. TRIPS and EU direc-
tives are binding in their result, yet leave Member States free in their
implementation.73 The Court of Justice of the European Union (the
“ECJ”) noted that freedom in implementing directives preserves the
cultural diversity of the Union which must be respected. It also opined
67 Harris, supra note 38, at 687.
68 See, e.g., id. (advocating applying the doctrine of adhesion in contracts to inter-
pret TRIPS as a method to remedy the unfairness of TRIPS and accommodate for
the national needs of individual Member States).
69 See id. at 737-38 (“TRIPS . . . affects critical aspects of society . . . and global
governance-related issues (e.g., the ability of states to determine for themselves
which issues take precedence and where to allocate scarce resources).”)
70 Id. at 717.
71 TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 8 (“Members may, in formulating or amending their
laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nu-
trition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their
socio-economic and technological development, provided that such measures are
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”)
72 See Harris, supra note 38, at 725 (“[T]he United States began efforts to move
intellectual property from WIPO to GATT . . . [GAAT] included the relatively
strong and effective enforcement mechanisms . . . Those mechanisms were one of
the prizes sought by the developed countries in TRIPS.”).
73 Compare supra Part I.B, with infra Part III C.2.b.iv.
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that the ability to enforce directives against the state is necessary for
the effectiveness of the EU system.74 Fifth, the enforcement would pro-
vide an avenue of relief for citizens of the Member State who may not
be able to enforce their rights against their own nation since the DSU
is reserved for disputes between Member States.75
2. Argument Against Private Enforcement of TRIPS
Certainly this comment is not blind to the possible adverse ef-
fect of private enforcement of TRIPS or even its impossibility. First,
giving Member States the power to interpret TRIPS may amount to
judicial activism that rewrites TRIPS provisions and alters members’
rights and obligations.76 Second, the power may also lead developing
countries to avoid the democratic framework of the WTO.77 Third, the
mechanism may be futile as the United States and other developed
countries would probably strive to circumvent any adverse interpreta-
tion of TRIPS by resorting to unilateral pressures outside the scope of
TRIPS.78 Such may lead developed countries to obtain the same or
greater obligations from developing countries.79
PART II: THE PATH TO PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF TRIPS
AGAINST MEMBER STATES
After providing the abovementioned background information
about the WTO, it is helpful to reiterate the main theoretical exercise
of this comment. The discussion below will provide the structure of the
proposal, its components, and its conclusion.
A. A Proposal for Private Enforcement of TRIPS against Member
States
1. The Proposal
In simple terms, the proposal provides a procedure: (i) by which
private litigants can enforce the TRIPS agreement; (ii) against a Mem-
74 See Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office., 1974 E.C.R. 1337, para 12. (“[T]he
useful effect of such an act would be weakened if individuals were prevented from
relying on it before their national courts and if the latter were prevented from
taking it into consideration as an element of Community law.”).
75 See supra Part I.C.
76 See e.g. Harris, supra note 38, at 746 (stating that applying the contract’s doc-
trine of adhesion as part of DSB interpretation of TRIPS may amount to judicial
activism and may allow WTO panels and Appellate Body to rewrite TRIPS provi-
sions and alter member’s rights and obligations.).
77 Id. at 746.
78 Id. at 752.
79 Id.
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ber State; (iii) in circumstances where the Member State fails to afford
private parties their rights that TRIPS confer on them.
2. Its Feasibility
The objective of the proposal is feasible because of two reasons:
(1) the special nature of TRIPS implementation which makes it more
fixable for private enforcement; and (2) the EU Principles of Direct Ef-
fect80 and State Liability provide,81 a well-developed framework ex-
isting in very similar circumstances.
B. The Special Nature of TRIPS
What makes this exercise less futile and more plausible is the
special nature of the TRIPS agreement. There are several characteris-
tics of TRIPS that make the agreement more malleable to private en-
forcement against a Member State than its sister agreements, the
GATT and GATS.
First, unlike GATT and GATS, the agreement requires Mem-
ber States to implement domestic laws that translate the TRIPS pro-
tections within the legal order of the Member State.82 This step
removes the protection from the realm of international law and makes
the protection afforded by the agreement a part of the domestic law.
Generally, in the context of international law, the relationship be-
tween a private claim and an international public treaty is rarely suffi-
ciently direct so that it may be said to “arise under” the treaty.83 By
contrast, the domestic laws implementing TRIPS become “the carrier
of the protection.” Consequently, private individuals could challenge
such law within the domestic system based on grounds such as: consti-
tutionality, due process, equal protection of citizen, public interest,
morals, etc.84
Second, taking the United States as an example, an interna-
tional treaty becomes part of the legal order if it is self-executing or if
Congress ratifies it.85 Consequently “[b]ecause a treaty ratified by the
80 See infra Part III.C.2.b.
81 See infra Part III.C.2.c.
82 TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 1.1 (“Members shall give effect to the provisions of
this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law
more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such
protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.”).
83 44B AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 178.
84 See, e.g., Novartis v. UOI (Madras H.C.), supra note 14, para. 5 (answering the
question of whether Indian national law that implementing the TRIPS agreement
on the basis that it is against the Constitution of India).
85 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008) (“[T]reaties ‘may comprise interna-
tional commitments . . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has either en-
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United States is not only the law of [the United States] . . . but also an
agreement among sovereign powers,” the U.S. Supreme Court “tradi-
tionally considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiating and
drafting history . . . and the postratification understanding of the con-
tracting parties.”86 Similarly, and in the context of WTO, interpreta-
tion of domestic laws could be performed in light of TRIPS.87
Third, in implementing TRIPS into their legal order, Member
States usually have discretion over the implementation that may be
abused or erroneously exercised. This discretion isderived from Article
27 of TRIPS which provides that “[m]embers may exclude from patent-
ability inventions . . . to protect [public order] or morality, including to
protect human, animal or plant life or health.”88 A Member State how-
ever, may err in its implementation.89 Such error would be a breach of
the Member State’s treaty obligations90 and damages should be re-
served to compensate the injured party. This becomes more relevant if
the error caused an injury to a citizen of the State itself. In this case,
the DSU would not be hear the claim because it would be paradoxical
for a nation to sue itself.91
1. A Case Exactly on Point: Novartis v. UOI.
The special characteristics of TRIPS make it the “path of least
resistance” for private litigants to enforce their WTO rights within,
and particularly against, a Member State. Indeed, private litigants
discovered such a path rather quickly. In 2005, the claimants in
Novartis v. UOI,92 challenged India’s Patent Act implementing the
TRIPS agreement within a year from its complete adoption into the
acted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be
‘self-executing’ and is ratified on these terms.’”).
86 Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996).
87 Cf. TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 41.5 (“It is understood that this Part does not
create any obligation to put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general, nor
does it affect the capacity of Members to enforce their law in general.”).
88 TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 27, para. 2.
89 See, e.g., C-393/93, The Queen v. H. M. Treasury ex parte British Telecomm.
Plc, 1993 E.C.R. I-1656, paras. 39, 40. (holding that EU directives, which require
national implementation, give rise to state liability when incorrectly implemented
in the national legal order of a Member State).
90 TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 1.1 (“Members shall give effect to the provisions of
[the TRIPS] Agreement.”).
91 See DSU, supra note 4, art. 1.1 (“The rules and procedures of the DSU shall . . .
apply to . . . the settlement of disputes between Members concerning their rights
and obligations under the provisions of the [ WTO] Agreement . . . .”).
92 See Novartis v. UOI (Madras H.C.), supra note 14.
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Indian legal order in 2005.93 The case sheds lights on the special na-
ture of TRIPS and the agreement’s similarity to the EU directives. I
examine the relevant facts and the procedural posture of the case to
highlight these points.
a. The General Facts
Novartis International AG (“Novartis”) is a public pharmaceu-
tical corporation headquartered in Basel, Switzerland.94 In 1998,
Novartis filed a product-improvement patent in India for a drug used
for the treatment of blood cancer.95 Prior to its accession to the WTO,
India’s patent law only allowed for process, but not product, patents
for pharmaceutical inventions.96 After implementing the latest
amendment to the Patent Act 1970, India removed the restriction on
product patent for pharmaceutical compounds in 2005. However, the
amendment added section 3(d) which prevents trivial modification to
existing pharmaceutical inventions.97
The patent application was for the Beta Crystalline (“Beta”)
form of an already patented product, Imatinib Mesylate salt,98 and
marketed in India under the name “Gleevec.”99 Novartis claimed that
Beta has more beneficial flow properties, better thermodynamic stabil-
ity, and lower hygroscopicity than Gleevec.100 The company alleged
that these properties make Beta a new and superior product.101
93 The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970 amended by The Patents (Amendment) Act, No.
17 of 1999, The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 38 of 2002, and The Patents
(Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005 [hearinafter The Patent Act 1970], available at
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_Act_1970_28012013_book.pdf
94 About Navartis, NOVARTIS US, http://www.us.novartis.com/about-novartis/in-
dex.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
95 Novartis v. UOI (Ind.), supra note 14, paras. 2, 8.
96 The Patent Act 1970, supra note 93, §5 (“[N]o patent shall be granted in respect
of claims for the substances themselves, but claims for the methods or processes of
manufacture shall be patentable.”); see also Linda L. Lee, Note, Trials and TRIPS-
Ulations: Indian Patent Law and Novartis AG v. Union of India, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 281, 284 (2008).
97 See Patent Act 1970, supra note 93, §3(d) (“[T]he mere discovery of a new form
of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known
efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for
a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus
unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one new
reactant.”).
98 Id. para. 8.
99 Id. para. 2.
100 Id. para. 8.
101 Id.
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In 2006, The Office of Controller General of Patents, Designs
and Trademarks (“Controller”)102 rejected the application primarily on
the basis that section 3(d) of the Patents Act 1970 disallowed the pat-
entability of Beta.103 Novartis petitioned the Indian government to re-
verse the Controller’s decision and due to subject matter jurisdiction
reasons, the case was bifurcated.104 Novartis appealed the decision of
the Controller General to the Intellectual Property Appellate Board
(“IPAB”) which dismissed the Novartis appeal.105 Novartis then peti-
tioned the Supreme Court to grant the patent and review the case on
the merits.106 The Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and
stayed the IPAB decision by dismissing the case.
In addition to the IPAB appeal, Novartis challenged section
3(d) in another proceeding, on constitutionality grounds and compli-
ance with TRIPS by petition to the Madras High Court. Novartis al-
leged that section 3(d) was not compliant with TRIPS and that section
3(d) was vague, unambiguous and in violation of Article 14 of the Con-
stitution.107 The Madras High Court also dismissed the petition.
b. The Madras Court Arguments
Novartis challenges section 3(d) on two grounds, mainly that
“(a) it is not compatible to [TRIPS] and (b) it is arbitrary, illogical,
vague and offends Article 14 of the Constitution of India.”108 The
Court then entertained three questions: (i) whether the Court has ju-
risdiction to review the compatibility of Section 3(d) with TRIPS, and
alternatively whether the Court can grant declaratory relief that sec-
tion 3(d) is not compliant with TRIPS; (ii) assuming that the Court has
jurisdiction, whether Section 3(d) is compliant with TRIPS; and (iii)
102 INDIA CONTROLLER GENERAL OF PATENTS, DESIGNS AND TRADEMARKS, http://
www.ipindia.nic.in/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). The Patent Act vest most powers
to the Controller, and the Controller may delegate some powers to subordinate
offices. Lee, supra note 99, 287. Filing of a patent is done through one of the multi-
ple offices of Controller. See Patents, CONTROLLER GENERAL OF PATENTS DESIGNS
AND TRADEMARKS, http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patents.htm (last visited Mar. 13,
2014).
103 Novartis v. UOI (Ind.), supra note 14, para. 14.
104 See Lee, supra note 96, 299-300.
105 In 2007, The Intellectual Property Appellate Board commenced to hear ap-
peals from the decisions of the Controller of Patents. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
APPELLATE BROAD, http://www.ipab.tn.nic.in/ (last visited Mar. 2014); See also Lee,
supra note 96, at 288 n.50.
106 Novartis v. UOI (Ind.), supra note 14, para. 16.
107 Novartis v. UOI (Madra H.C.), supra note 14, para. 2.
108 Id.
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whether Section 3(d) violates Article 14109 of the Constitution of
India.110
i. Jurisdiction
Although the Court rejected the argument, it is not surprising
that Novartis relied on a case from the United Kingdom addressing
the direct applicability of EU law within the United Kingdom. In
Equal Opportunities Commission v. Secretary of State for Employ-
ment,111 the British courts answered the question of whether claim-
ants have standing to challenge United Kingdom laws that are
incompatible with EU directives in a British court. The court answered
the question in the affirmative by relying on Section 2 of the European
Communities Act, 1972 which recognizes that EU treaties’ rights are
“without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the
United Kingdom shall be recognized and available in law, and be en-
forced, allowed and followed accordingly.” The Madras Court held that
the European Community Act “domesticated” EU laws as the domestic
laws of England. By contrast, India did not domesticate TRIPS.112 Ad-
ditionally, the Court rejected jurisdiction because TRIPS is a contrac-
tual agreement between Member States and opined that the
contracting parties decided that disputes shall be resolved by the
DSB.113
Regarding the alternative argument, the Could held that de-
claratory relief should not be given where it would serve no useful pur-
pose to Novartis because Novartis could not compel the Indian
legislators to amend or enact a law even if the Court declares that sec-
tion 3(d) is unconstitutional.114
ii. Compliance with TRIPS
After rejecting jurisdiction, the Madras Court did not examine
section 3(d) compliance with TRIPS. However, the court recognized the
flexibility of TRIPS to accommodate individual needs of the Member
States.115
109 INDIA CONST. art. 14. (“The State shall not deny to any person equality before
the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”).
110 Novartis v. UOI (Madras H.C. ), supra note 14, paras. 5, 6.
111 R v. Sec’y of State for Emp’t, [1994] UKHL 2, [1995] A.C. 1 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Eng.) available at  http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1994/2.html.
112 Novartis AG v. UOI (Madra H.C.), supra note 14, para. 6.
113 Id. para. 8.
114 Id. para  9.
115 Id. para. 15.
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iii. Constitutionality
The Madras Court also held that section 3(d) did not violate
Article 14 of the Constitution of India and was not vague or arbi-
trary.116 The court acknowledged that section 3(d) contains undefined
terms that were not defined in the Patent Act.117 However, it held that
legislators use general language and leave discretion to administrative
agencies to interpret the language based on the facts of each case.118
c. The Supreme Court Arguments
The India Supreme Court reviewed the appeal from the IPAB
on the rejection of the Gleevec patent by the Patent Office.119 As men-
tioned above, prior to the signing of TRIPS, India did not allow for
product patents.120 The Court acknowledged India’s obligation under
TRIPS121 and heavily discussed some of the articles of the TRIPS
Agreement.122
The three relevant sections affected by the amendment are:
section 2(1)(j), 2(1)(ja), and section 3(d) of the Patent Act, 1970.123 Sec-
tion 2(1)(j) requires a product to satisfy three conditions to qualify as
invention.124 The product must be: i) new, ii) involve an inventive step,
and iii) capable of an industrial application.125 Inventive step is de-
fined in section 2(1)(ja) as a feature of an invention that involves tech-
nical advance and makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled
in the art.126
The Court held that Beta did not qualify as an invention. It
held that patent was for a known substance and hence did not qualify
as an “invention” in terms of Section 2(1)(j)127 and Section 2(1)(ja)128 of
116 Id. para. 19.
117 Id. para. 14.
118 Id.
119 Novartis v. UOI (Ind.), supra note 14.
120 Novartis v. UOI (Madra H.C.), supra note 14, para. 24 (“[T]he Patent Act,
1970, had a provision in section 5 . . . that barred grant of patent to substance
intended for use . . . as food or medicine or drug . . . .”).
121 Novartis v. UOI (Ind.), supra note 14, para. 59.
122 Id.
123 Id. para. 3.
124 Id. para. 88.
125 Id.
126 Id. para. 89.
127 Patent Act, 1970, supra note 93, § 2(1)(j) (“ ‘invention’ means a new product or
process involving an inventive step and capable of industrial application.”).
128 Patent Act, 1970, supra note 93, § 2(1)(ja) (“ ‘inventive step’ means a feature of
an invention that involves technical advance as compared to the existing knowl-
edge or having economic significance or both and that makes the invention not
obvious to a person skilled in the art.”).
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the Act.129 The Court also held that section3(d) bars the patentability
of Beta.130 It held that Beta is a new form of a known substance and
thus fully implicates section 3(d).131 Further, it held the mere change
of form with properties inherent to that form would not qualify as “en-
hancement of efficacy” of a known substance.132
The Court also analyzed the amendments’ compliance with
TRIPS. The appellees, Union of India, asserted that the Act is fully
compliant with TRIPS.133 They took the stand that TRIPS has suffi-
cient flexibility in a manner to avoid an adverse impact on public-
health.134 The Court agreed. It held that TRIPS allows Member States
to take “public order”—such preventing the deprivation of affordable
drugs to the poor—considerations in implementing its commit-
ments.135 It also held that in amending its legislation, India strove to
balance its international treaty commitment and the promotion of pub-
lic health.136
d. Conclusion
All the arguments advanced in the Novartis v. UOI decisions
show the special nature of TRIPS and its similarity to EU directives.
The case shed light on the availability of private enforcement vehicles
that individual could potentially raise against a signatory Member
States. The enforcement mechanisms include constitutional chal-
lenges, declaratory judgments, and interpretation of domestic laws in
light of an international treaty. Such mechanisms are what make
TRIPS a flexible treaty for private enforcement.
C. Relying on the Principles of Direct Effect and State Liability to
Establish a Mechanism of Enforcement
The Section below discusses the relevance of EU law to the pro-
posal of this comment. It then provides background on the relevant EU
jurisprudence and the Principles of Direct Effect and State Liability.
1. Why EU laws May Be Relevant to the Proposal
The abovementioned mechanisms do not provide full protection
to private litigants in enforcing their TRIPS rights. All the challenges
discussed above are related to existing laws in the national legal order.
129 Novartis v. UOI (Ind.), supra note 14,  paras. 133, 162.
130 Id. para. 191.
131 Id. para. 161.
132 Id. para. 181.
133 Id. para. 65.
134 Novartis v. UOI (Ind.), supra note 14, para. 65.
135 Id. para. 66.
136 Id.
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However, there exist situations where such mechanisms cannot help
the private litigants. A gap in the protection would be apparent in two
hypothetical circumstances. First, where the Member State fails to im-
plement TRIPS as there would be no national law to challenge. Sec-
ond, a national law implementing TRIPS could be constitutional on its
face but contrary to TRIPS obligations. In these situations, the only
recourse to the private litigants, apart from the normal DSU path, is
perhaps the direct applicability of TRIPS. Consequently, the EU Prin-
ciples of Direct Effect and State Liability become relevant to the propo-
sal of this comment.
Direct applicability, however, is an extreme measure. In order
to provide a safeguard to Member States against uncontrolled direct
applicability, this option should be conditioned to circumstances where
the Member State fails to honor its obligation or if the Member State is
in clear breach of its TRIPS obligation. In order to achieve this objec-
tive, this comment learns from the EU Principles of Direct Effect and
State Liability to provide private individual with recovery recourse
while reserving direct applicability for cases of breach.
2. The Relevant EU Jurisprudence and Laws
After establishing the special nature of TRIPS, this comment
proposes utilizing the principles of Direct Effect and State Liability to
establish the mechanism of enforcement. Thus, before drawing analo-
gies and exploring the WTO in light of the EU legal order, it is neces-
sary to lay a foundational background on the relevant EU laws. The
following section briefly details some relevant EU concepts necessary
to the understanding of the Principle of Direct Effect and State
Liability.
a. Types of EU Legislations
Prior to exploring the principles of Direct Effect and State Lia-
bility, it is necessary to examine the scope and types of EU legisla-
tions. The ability to invoke the right in a court of law depends on the
type of the legislations. There are two types of legislations: (i) Primary
and (ii) Secondary.
Primary Legislations are the founding EU Treaties: The Treaty
on European Union137 (“TEU”), Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
137 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Oct. 2012, 2012  O.J.
(C 326) [hereinafter TEU].
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pean Union138 (“TEFU”), and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union.139
Secondary Legislations are legislative acts by Union institu-
tions and are listed in Article 288 TFEU.140 They included regulations,
directives, decisions, and recommendations. Regulations are generally
applicable, binding in their entirely, and directly applicable in all
Member States as soon as they enter into force, they must be complied
with fully by those to whom they apply (private persons, Member
States, Union Institutions), and they do not require implementing acts
to be transported into national law.141 Decisions are binding in their
entirety on those they are addressed to (Member States, natural or
legal person).142 Recommendations and Opinions do not confer rights
or obligation on those to whom they are addressed to.143
Directives are binding as to the result to be achieved upon any
Member States to whom they are addressed.144 Just like TRIPS, na-
tional legislators must adopt a transporting act or implementing mea-
sure to transport directives and bring national law in line with the
directives’ objectives.145 Directives are the most relevant type of secon-
dary legislations for the purpose of this comment and for the discus-
sion of the Principle of Direct Effect discussed below.
b. The Principle of Direct Effect
i. Generally
The European law not only engenders obligations for Member
States, but also rights for individuals.146 Consequently, the Principle
of Direct Effect was enshrined by the ECJ and it enables individuals to
invoke EU law before national and EU courts, independent of whether
national law exists.147 Individuals may therefore take advantage of
these rights and directly invoke European acts before national and Eu-
ropean courts. Under the Principle of Direct Effect, an EU law will
138 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Oct. 10, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 236) [hereinafter TFEU].
139 Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the European Union, Oct. 10, 2012,
2012 O.J. (C 326).
140 TFEU, supra note 138, art. 288.
141 The European Parliament, supra note 16, at 2.
142 Id. at 3.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 European Union, The Direct Effect of EU law, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legisla-
tion_summaries/institutional_affairs/decisionmaking_process/l14547_en.htm (last
updated Sept. 22, 2010).
147 Id.
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prevails over national legislation.148 For example, an EU law provision
creates a directly applicable right which a nationals of a Member State
could invoke in a national court.149
ii. Aspects of Direct Effect
There are two aspects to the principle: a vertical aspect and
horizontal aspect.150 Vertical direct effect (“VDE”) concerns relation-
ship between individuals and the State.151 It means that an individual
could invoke an EU provision against the State.152 Horizontal direct
effect (“HDE”) concerns relationships between private parties. It
means that an individual could invoke an EU provision against an-
other individual.153
Depending on the type of EU act or legislation, the ECJ
adopted either “full direct effect” that include horizontal direct effect
and a vertical direct effect or “partial direct effect” which is confined to
VDE.154 However, this comment only analyzes VDE because it con-
cerns enforcement of private rights against a State.
iii. The Direct Effect of EU Legislations
Primary legislations are directly effective155 (vertical and hori-
zontal) on the condition that they are precise, clear, unconditional and
they require no additional measures.156 Regulations always have di-
rect effect.157 Decisions may have direct effect when they are ad-
dressed to a Member State.158
Directives differ from primary legislations and regulation in
their direct effect. Because directives are addressed to Member
States—as opposed to creating private rights—in principle, they are
not directly applicable.159 The ECJ, however, recognizes in case law
148 Id.
149 Van en Loose, C-26/62 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Be-
lastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 3, ¶8. .
150 European Union, supra note 146.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 See  Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen, 1963
E.C.R. 3, 13.
156 See Joined Case C-46 & 48/93, Brasserie du Peˆcheur v. Bundesrepublik
Deutschland,  The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Transp. ex parte Factortame Ltd.,
1996 E.C.R. I-1029, ¶ X [hereinafter Factortame].
157 TFEU, supra note 138, art. 288.
158 European Union, supra note 146.
159 Id. By contrast, directives do not impose horizontal direct effects. The ECJ rec-
ognized some exceptions for the HDE of directive in limited number of cases. This
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the partial or vertical direct effect of directives in order to protect the
rights of individuals against a Member State in the national courts of
the Member State.
Van Duyn160 is the case that primarily established the Princi-
ple of Direct Effect in the EU legal order. In Van Duyn, the plaintiff
was a Dutch national who was offered a position as a secretary with
the Church of Scientology in England.161 The English government re-
fused the plaintiff’s entry into the United Kingdom because England
did not agree with the ideology of the Church.162 The plaintiff relied on
a directive on the free movement of workers and claimed that her re-
fusal of entry was unlawful. England has implemented the directive
but did not adopt its exact wording.163 The ECJ held that the directive
confers on individuals rights which are enforceable by them in the na-
tional courts of a Member State and which national courts must
protect.164
iv. Conditions for the VDE of Directives
An individual can rely on a directive against any national pro-
vision which is incompatible with the directive or if the provisions of
the directive define rights which individuals are able to assert against
the Member State.165 The conditions for the application of the Princi-
ple of Direct Effect are laid down in the Marshall decision.166 The prin-
ciple is applicable when: (1) The Member State failed to implement the
directive or incorrectly implemented the directive,167 (2) the deadline
means that a directive may not of itself impose obligations on an individual and
that a provision of a directive may not be relied upon against another private
party. Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton & South-West Hampshire Area
Health Auth., 1986 E.C.R. 723, para. 48. The jurisprudence of HDE will not be
discussed in this comment. See generally C-106/89, Marleasing v. La Comercial
Internacional de Alimentacion, 1990 E.C.R. I 4135.
160 Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office., 1974 E.C.R. 1337.
161 Id. at 1343.
162 Id. at 1340.
163 See id.
164 Id. at 1352.
165 Case C-6/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. I-5357, ¶11.
166 Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton & South-West Hampshire Area Health
Auth., 1986 E.C.R. 723.
167 Marshall, 1986 E.C.R. 723, para. 46. In Marshall, the appellant worked as
dietitian for a public health institute was dismissed at the age of sixty-two. Id.
paras. 3, 4. England legislations provide that state pension is to be granted to men
from the age of 65 and for women at the age of 60. Id. para. 7. The appellant
contended that her dismissal was based on sex discrimination, Id. para. 9., and
infringed on principle of quality of treatment laid down by an EU directive. Id.
para. 10. The Court held that an individual may rely on a directive where the
State fails to implement the directive or incorrectly implement the directive, pro-
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to implement the directive has expired,168 or (3) the obligation in ques-
tion is unconditional and sufficiently precise.169 On the precision of the
directive, factors to consider are the identity of the person entitled to
the guarantee, the content of the minimum guarantee, and the iden-
tity of the person liable to provide the guarantee,170 and (4) the State
or an organ of the state is a party against which enforcement is
claimed.171
c. The Principle of State Liability
i. Generally
The principle of State Liability takes the principle of direct ef-
fect a step further by compensating the plaintiff for damages in con-
nection with a Member State’s failure to honor its EU obligations. In
vided that the directive in unconditional, sufficiently precise, and the State is a
party against which the enforcement is claimed. Id. para. 46. The Court also held
that England law conflicted with the directive and the appellant may rely on the
EU directive to set aside the national law. Id. Summary of Judgment  para. 1.
168 Case 148/78, Ratti., 1979 E.C.R. 1629, para. 43. In Ratti, the ECJ held that “it
is only at the end of the prescribed period and in the event of the Member State’s
default. Id. at 1629.
169 Id. para. 23.
170 Joint Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich & Bonifaci v. Italy 1991 E.C.R. I-5357,
para. 12. In Francovich, employees of companies that declared insolvencies sued
their employer to recover compensation guaranteed by EU directive intended to
guarantee employees a minimum level or protection under EU law in the event of
the insolvency of their employer. Id. para. 3. The Member State, Italy, failed to
implement the directive. Id. para. 4. The Member State, Italy, failed to implement
the directive. The Court examined from the terms of the directives that the per-
sons entitled to the guarantee were employees. Id. para. 13.  The Court also ex-
amined the content of the directive and held that the directive provides that
measures must be taken to ensure the payment of outstanding claims resulting
from contract of employment. Id. para. 15. Finally with regards to the identity of
the person liable to provide the guarantee, the ECJ quoted the directive and held
that from its terms, the entity responsible of the guarantee is the Member State.
Id. para. 25.  With regard to the unconditional nature of the directive, the Court
also held that even when the state has discretion in its options to provide compen-
sation that the possibility of limiting the guarantee under the directive does not
make it impossible to determine the minimum guarantee. Id. para. 20.
171 C-80/86, Kolpinghuis Nijmegen, 1987 E.C.R. 3969, ¶ 10 (“A national authority
may not rely, as against an individual, upon a provision of a directive whose neces-
sary implementation in national law has not yet taken place.”). In Marshall, the
plaintiff claimed that her rights were violated by a public health institute as op-
posed to the state itself. Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton and South-West
Hampshire Area Health Auth., 1986 E.C.R. 723, para. 2. The ECJ held that direc-
tives do not impose obligation on private individuals but a person may rely on the
directive against a State employer or public authority. Id. paras. 48, 51.
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Marshall, the plaintiff was able to use the principle of direct effect to
set national legislations that contradicted an EU directive.172 By con-
trast, in Francovich, the case that sets the jurisprudence to State Lia-
bility, the plaintiffs relied on the principle of state liability for
damages compensation caused by state failure to comply with EU
law.173
aaaaa
ii. State Liability Conditions Dependent on Type of Breach
The conditions under which liability gives the right to repara-
tion depends on the nature of the breach of EU law.174 There are four
types of breaches recognized by the ECJ that gives the right of dam-
ages by the Member State.
1. Failure to Implement a Directive.
In Francovich,175 the ECJ sets down the state liability juris-
prudence for failure to implement a directive or the Francovich Princi-
ple. The ECJ held that “[a] national court must, in accordance with the
national rules on liability, uphold the right of [individual] to obtain
reparation of loss and damage caused to them as a result of failure to
transport the directive.”176 Technically, the failure to implement a di-
rective is a breach of primary legislation, Article 189 of the Treaty,
which requires a Member States to take all the necessary measures to
achieve the result intended by the directive.177
For failure to implement a directive, the ECJ established the
condition for State Liability: (i) the directive must confer rights on in-
dividual,178 (ii) “it should be possible identify the content of those
rights on the basis of the provisions of the directive”,179 and (iii) there
must exist a causal link between the breach of the State’s obligation
and damages suffered.180
In Francovich, the ECJ upheld the liability of Italy to Italian
employees where Italy failed to implement a directive intended to pro-
tect employees in case of employer insolvency. The Court held that the
directive confers a right on employees because the directive “entails
the grant to employees of a right to a guarantee of payment of their
172 Marshall, 1986 E.C.R. 723, ¶ 56
173 Case C-6/90. Francovich v. Italy,1991 E.C.R. I-5357, para. 28.
174 Id. para 38.
175 Id. para. 1.
176 Id. para. 45.
177 Id. para. 39.
178 Id. para. 40.
179 Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. I-5357, para. 40.
180 Id.
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unpaid wages claims.”181 The Court used its analysis in determining
the direct effect of the directive to establish that the content of the
rights could be determined on the basis for the provision of the direc-
tive.182 Finally, on causation, the Court held that it is in accordance
with the national rules on liability and that national courts determine
damages and causation.183
2. National Legislation in Breach of a Treaty Provision.
In Factortame, the ECJ set down the state liability jurispru-
dence for national measures that are contrary to the fundamental EU
treaty provisions.184 The ECJ held in Factortame that primary EU
provisions “have direct effect in the sense that they confer on individu-
als rights upon which they are entitled to rely directly before the na-
tional courts. Breach of such provisions may give rise to
reparation.”185
For national measures that are contrary to the EU, the ECJ
established the condition for State Liability. First, the rule infringed
must confer a right on the individual. Second, the breach must be suf-
ficiently serious established by whether the MS manifestly and
gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion.186 The Court laid
down the factors that must be assessed by the national courts,187 in
determining the seriousness of the breach.188 The factors include: (i)
the clarity and precision of the rule breached, (ii) the measure of dis-
cretion available to MS in complying with the primary legislation pro-
vision, (iii) whether the infringement was intentional and voluntarily,
and (iv) whether the error of law was excusable or inexcusable.189
Third, there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the EU
law and the damages suffered.190
181 Id. para. 43.
182 Id. para. 44.
183 Id. para. 45.
184 Factortame, supra note 156.
185 Id. para. 23.
186 Id. para. 55.
187 Id. para. 58.
188 Id. para. 56.
189 Id.
190 Factortame, supra note 156, para. 51. In Factortame, French beer manufactur-
ers brought action against Germany for losses suffered when Germany imposed
marketing restrictions on French beer. The manufacturer alleged that the restric-
tion was incompatible with Article 30 TFEU, which prohibits marketing restric-
tion on lawfully manufactured products by different MS state. Id. para. 4. The
Court opined that in the absence of harmonization, i.e no directives or regulations,
the national legislature has wide discretion in lying down rules that achieve the
objective of the primary EU law, i.e. the EU treaty provisions. Id. para. 23. On the
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3. Incorrect Implementation of EU Directive.
The case of Ex Parte British Telecom involved the incorrect im-
plementation of a directive. The court applied the State liability princi-
ple subject to Factortame191 conditions.192
4. Decision of an Administrative Authority.
In Hedley-Lomas, the ECJ held that the decision of an adminis-
trative authority that is not compliant with a directive constituted a
breach of a primary legislation.193 Because the infringement is a
breach of a primary legislation, the court applied the condition of state
liability under Factortame.194 The Court held that the Member State
has an obligation to compensate the claimant for damages caused by a
refuel to issue an export license.195
first element, the Court held that the marketing restriction was prohibited by Ar-
ticle 30. Id. para. 54. Additionally, it held that the provision not only imposed re-
striction on MS, it also confers rights on individuals. Id. On the second element,
the Court left the determination to national courts; however, it commented that it
would be difficult to consider the marketing prohibition on beer as excusable error.
Id. para. 59. On the third, element the Court left it for national courts to deter-
mine causation and damages under national law. Id. para. 65.
191 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
192 C-393/93, The Queen v. H. M. Treasury ex parte British Telecomm. Plc, 1993
E.C.R. I-1656, paras. 39, 40. In Ex Parte British Telecom British company initi-
ated a proceeding against the government of the United Kingdom for annulling a
national legislation implementing an EU directive. Id. para. 2. The Court held
that the U.K. national legislations went beyond the scope of the directive and im-
plemented the directive incorrectly. Id. para. 29. The Court, however, held that the
breach in this case is not sufficiently serious, and hence the Member State was not
required to compensate the claimant. Id.  para. 45.
193 Case C-5/94, The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte
Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. I-2553, para. 17.
194 Id. para. 26.
195 Id. para. 27. In Hedley, the claimant, an Irish company, initiated a proceeding
when the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Good for England and Wales re-
fused to issue the plaintiff a license for export of live sheep to Spain. Id. para. 17.
The administrative authority refused the license on the ground that Spain’s
slaughterhouses treatment of animals was contrary to an EU directive. Id. paras.
2, 3. Spain has implemented the directive into its national law and after com-
plaints from the U.K and negotiation with the EU Commission; Spain strength-
ened its compliance with the directive. Id. paras. 6, 8. The Court held that the
decision of an administrative authority was is non-compliant with the directive
constitute a quantitative restriction on expert, contrary to the primary legislation,
Article 34 of the Treaty. Id. para. 17.
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5. Post Factortame Cases
Several modern cases expanded the Principle of State Liability
including liability of public bodies. In Haim, the Court held that
“[c]ommunity law does not preclude a public-law body, in addition to
the Member State itself, from being liable to make reparation for loss
and damage caused to individuals as a result of measures which it
took in breach of Community law.”196 The Court opined that where
conditions for state liability are met, the Member State must compen-
sate private individuals for breach of Community law by a public-law
body.197
PART III: APPLY EU LAW PRINCIPLES TO NOVARTIS v. UOI
The Novartis v. UOI case provides an excellent fact pattern to
apply the Principles of Direct Effect and State Liability to enforce the
rights of private individuals against a Member State in breach of its
WTO obligations.
A. Options Available for Novartis
In applying the principle of EU law, Novartis would have two
options.
First, Novartis could rely on the Principle of Direct Effect to set
aside section 3(d) of the Patent Act 1970 that bars its patent applica-
tion. Second, Novartis could also rely on the Principle of State Liability
and require compensation for damages resulting from the Patent Of-
fice decision that rejected the Beta patent. In relying on the principle
of State Liability, Novartis would assert that the breach is due to ei-
ther (i) failure of the state to implement TRIPS correctly or (ii) the
Patent Office, which is a public office, infringed its rights granted by
the Patent (Amendment) Act, 2005, implementing the TRIPS agree-
ment into the Indian legal order.
For the sake of brevity, this comment only considers the Novar-
tis v. UOI case in light of the Principle of Direct Effect.
B. Applying the Principle of Direct Effect to the Novartis v. UOI
Fact Pattern
In paralleling the EU procedure and applying the principle of
Direct Effect discussed above to the Novartis v. UOI case, the Member
State would be India, the directive-like law is the TRIPS agreement,
196 C-429/97, Haim v. Kassenzahna¨rztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein, 2000 E.C.R.
I-5168.
197 Id. paras. 31-33. The claimant in Haim was a dental practitioner who raised a
proceeding against Member State public body in order to obtain compensation for
financial losses by breach of EU law by the public body. Id. para. 2
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the national law is the India’s Patent Act, 1970 as amended by Patent
Amendment of 2005, and the private litigant would Novartis. Novartis
would also claim the direct effect of TRIPS to set aside national Indian
law that is contrary to TRIPS. The requirements of EU Direct Effect in
light of the TRIPS agreements are as follow:
1. The Member State, India, failed to implement TRIPS or in-
correctly implemented TRIPS.198 India did not fail to imple-
ment the TRIPS agreement199 but Novartis could claim
that India failed to implement the directive correctly. Just
like Marshall,200 Novartis could claim that Indian national
law conflicted with TRIPS and the appellant may rely on
TRIPS directly to set aside the national law.
2. The deadline to implement TRIPS has expired.201 This ele-
ment is satisfied because in Novartis v. UOI the patent was
rejected in 2006 after the implementation of TRIPS into
the Indian legal order in 2005.
3. The obligation in question is unconditional and sufficiently
precise.202 Certainly this would probably be the most con-
tested element. On the precision of the directive, the ECJ
in Francovich considered the terms of the agreement and
considered factors such as the identity of the person enti-
tled to the guarantee, the content of the minimum guaran-
tee, and the identity of the person liable to provide the
guarantee.203 With regard to the person entitled to the
guarantee in TRIPS, the agreement states that “[m]embers
shall make available to right holders civil judicial proce-
dures concerning the enforcement of any intellectual prop-
erty right covered by this Agreement.”204 The terms of the
agreement specifically state that the people entitled to the
guarantee are the holders of the rights.205 Additionally, the
content of the minimum guarantee is all intellectual prop-
erty covered by the agreement. Finally, the party responsi-
ble to provide the guarantee are the Member State. By
198 Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton & South-West Hampshire Area Health
Auth., 1986 E.C.R. 723, para. 46.
199 Novartis v. UOI (Ind.), supra note 14, para. 59.
200 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
201 Case 148/78, Criminal Proceeding Against Tullio Ratti., 1979 E.C.R. 1629,
para. 43.
202 Id. para 23.
203 S Joint Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich & Bonifaci v. Italy 1991 E.C.R. I-5357,
para. 12
204 TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 40.
205 See, e.g., Id art. 3 (“Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals . . . .”).
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contrast this element is undermined by provisions in
TRIPS that give the Member State discretion in imple-
menting the TRIPS obligation to take into consideration
measures that “promote the public interest in sectors of vi-
tal importance to their socio-economic.”206
4. The State or an organ of the state is a party against which
enforcement is claimed.207
Novartis would initiate the action against the Controller of
Patents.208 Just like Marshall where the plaintiff relied on the direc-
tive against a public health employer, Novartis may rely on TRIPS
against India’s Patent Office.
CONCLUSION
This comment proposes a mechanism for private enforcement
of TRIPS against signatory Member States of the WTO. The proposal
is feasible because of the special nature of the TRIPS agreement. The
agreement requires Member States to promulgate national laws that
provide minimum protection for intellectual property rights. Unlike its
sister agreements, GAAT and GATS, the TRIPS requirement of na-
tional implementation renders it more flexible for private enforce-
ment. This is because a private individual could challenge the national
laws implementing TRIPS as opposed to relying directly on TRIPS.
Nevertheless, even if the Member State does not promulgate national
laws, the proposal suggests that private enforcement is still possible.
This is because the requirement of national implementation of an in-
ternational agreement makes TRIPS very similar in nature to EU di-
rectives (and, in certain cases, treaties). EU directives are binding on
their result but give Member States freedom in their local implemen-
tation. Hence, it is possible to rely on the EU jurisprudence to provide
complete protection for individuals under the TRIPS agreement.
Under EU laws, a private citizen can enforce a directive or an
EU treaty against a Member State that fails to honor its EU obliga-
tion. Private enforcement procedures are based on the Principles of Di-
rect Effect and State Liability under the EU jurisprudence. The
proposal in this comment parallels these procedures to propose a po-
tential mechanism where private citizens can enforce TRIPS against
Member States of the WTO.
206 Id. art. 8.1.; see, e.g., Novartis v. UOI, supra note 14, para. 65.
207 Criminal Proceeding Against Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV, C-80/86, 1987 E.C.R.
3982, ¶10 (“A national authority may not rely, as against an individual, upon a
provision of a directive whose necessary implementation in national law has not
yet taken place.”).
208 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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An emerging trend towards private enforcement of TRIPS is
noticeable internationally. The Novartis case shows the shift towards
the direct effect of WTO laws within a Member State’s national order.
In this case, the claimant challenged India’s national laws that imple-
mented TRIPS on a constitutional basis. Additionally, they challenged
India’s compliance with its international obligations. In renderings it
decision, the courts of India relied directly on TRIPS to analyze the
adopted national legislation. The Madras High Court decided that In-
dia’s Patent Act, 1970 was constitutional. The Supreme Court of India
decided that the act was fully compliant with TRIPS. This significance
of the Novartis case is actually how the claim gained access to the
courts of India in the first place. The outcome of the case is probably a
secondary issue to the proposal of this comment. Nevertheless, the out-
come of the case could be significant if India’s national law clearly in-
fringes the Member State’s obligation under TRIPS or if the DSU
panels encounter a similar case and decides that product improvement
patents are protected under TRIPS.
